Monthly Archives: July 2013

How to build a Beijing Boat for 131 kuai

mmexport1375261251000

As a lover of home-made water crafts, I recently set out to build my own Beijing boat. The blueprint is simple, the supplies are all within striking distance, and it unlocks a lot of free fun in parks, canals and places like Houhai.

Supplies:

  • inflatable kiddie swimming pool: ~90 kuai
  • flat piece of wood: free (if you can find an unguarded construction site)
  • ~4 square meters of bubble wrap: ~5 kuai per square meter
  • saw: 15 kuai
  • sand paper: 4 kuai
  • tape/masking tape: 2 kuai
  • a home-made oar: whatever you value the sweeping end of your broom at, or a frisbee
  • (optional) camping tarp

IMG_20130714_123258  IMG_20130714_123305

Basic Theory: You are going to shape the wood to the interior of your swimming pool, soften/wrap it’s edges so it doesn’t pop your pool, place it on the floor of your pool, and you’re pretty much set. All a boat needs to do is displace enough water to create flotation, and that’s very easily done.

Step 1: fitting wood to inside of pool

Inflate swimming pool, and cut the wood so as to fit the interior. Remember to measure the kiddie pool a good few inches inside from the edges, because when you place the wood it will have to squeeze past the inflated pool walls. You’ll also want to round the corners on the wood to avoid any sharp/pressure-applying points.

mmexport1375261156889                 mmexport1375261188374

Step 2: sanding, wrapping wood

Sand down the edges of the wood, and then wrap it in bubble wrap. The more layers you add on, the safer and more comfortable it will be. I think we went with around 3 layers, which was plenty.

mmexport1375261209806                mmexport1375261241171

Step 3: reinforce pool floor with tape (probably optional)

This is my unscientific approach to reinforcing the plastic of the pool. I use tape to create something of a spider web that I hope will distribute the weight from the edge of the board. The bottom of the pool is soft, so my fear is always that there will be too much stress where the wood is essentially dragging the pool down. Go with your own method here, I’m making this up as I go along, but my boats haven’t failed me yet.

IMG_20130714_134744

Step 4: Grab a makeshift oar and get out on the water.

I was originally working with the sweeping end of a cheap broom, but found that it worked best when complimented by a frisbee. Below are pictures of the boat’s maiden voyage on the creeks and lakes of Chaoyang Park. It was a lot of fun, though eventually cut short by the repeated warnings of the lake police (湖管?). Next stop will probably be Houhai and a great night of drinking out on the water.

IMG_20130714_155604      mmexport1375261273033

mmexport1375261260186

Optional add ons:

When me and some friends slept in a similar boat one night we wrapped the exterior of the swimming pool in a camping tarp, which we then tied off around the top of the swimming pool. That relatively sturdy exterior shell protects the boat from the greatest threat: a tiny prick that deflates your pool and sinks your boat. I didn’t add one to the Beijing version but it still proved more than seaworthy on its maiden voyage.

Translation: Li Zuojun (李佐军) interview with Sanlian Life Weekly

Below is my translation of an interview that Li Zuojun (李佐军) gave to the Sanlian Life Weekly (三联生活周刊). As far as I know, this is the first time it’s been translated into English. It’s a long and at times dense interview, but I think the ideas expressed within it could prove very important for future economic reforms. I’ll give a bit of background on Li and then a brief statement of why I think his ideas are important before the interview.

Li Zuojun is the deputy director of the Resource and Environmental Policy Research Institute at the State Council Development Research Center. He’s gotten a lot of press recently because of a 2011 prediction that during the summer of 2013 the Chinese economy would experience an economic crisis. During the June credit crunch he was hailed as having predicted it, though I think a careful reading of that earlier prediction shows he was talking about something different (though still very interesting).

Li Zuojun

In this and other recent interviews Li has articulated a new framework for analyzing the challenges to the Chinese economy. He makes a case for a number of shifts in macro-economic analysis: away from demand-focused/Keynesian analysis and toward supply/productivity-focused analysis; away from the “three-horse carriage” (三驾马车) paradigm (exports, investment and consumption), and toward a focus on the “three engines” (三大发动机) of productivity, which he defines as institutional change, structural optimization and factor upgrades (制度变革, 结构优化, 要素升级).

This framework could provide insight into how the administration will approach economic reforms. So far the Xi-Li administration stated that it will initiate economic reforms in order jump-start a new age of balanced economic growth, but that slogan has yet to be put into a well-defined framework. The paradigm advanced by Li Zuojun could very well be adopted as an intellectual backdrop for future reforms.

I want to emphasize that I’m not a professional translator, but I did put in a lot of time to come up with what I think is a faithful translation of the original. I’ve highlighted one or two places where I’m really not sure what the correct translation would be. I’d love to hear suggestions for improvement.

Original interview: http://www.lifeweek.com.cn/2013/0718/41558.shtml

My translation:

Sanlian Life Weekly (SLW): You’ve said that looking at short-term trends in the Chinese economy, 2013 will be a “first-high,then-low”trend. What do you base this judgment on?

Li Zuojun (LZJ): I think that in 2013 the economy will follow a “first-high, then-low”trend, with shocks ahead  (前高后低、震荡前行的趋势). This includes both the market’s own cyclical adjustment and the government’s own pro-active adjustment. You can’t push forward transformations in the economic development model without having that development slow down.

There are a few reasons for the “first-high”: First, there was still some impetus from the rebound at the end of 2012. Path dependency means this growth can continue for a period of time. Second, the ascension of the new leadership has given investors and consumers some new confidence. Third, the central government has said that it wants to push forward urbanization. After they emphasized this urbanization push, local governments, capital markets, real estate developers all got some encouragement, and they gave a push to growth. Fourth, the international economic situation was improving, especially the continuation of the recovery in America, the stabilization of the Euro-zone, and Japan’s short-term economic improvements. These stimulated exports and boosted economic growth.

SLW: Why will the “then-low” emerge?

LZJ: As to the reasons for the “then-low”, I think one aspect is last May’s stimulus, when China utilized some growth-stabilizing measures. This was a certain degree of economic stimulus, and the effects of this kind of stimulus usually last about one year. For example, the 4 trillion yuan stimulus of early 2009 brought about a fast rebound in the economy, and that lasted for about one year. In reality, starting from the second quarter of 2010 the Chinese economy already exhibited a downward trend. Economic growth dropped from 12.1% in the Q1 2010 all the way to 7.4% in Q3 2012. You can see that the economic stimulus only cured the symptoms in the short-term but not the fundamental problem. As soon as the stimulus wore off, the economy began a downward trend. This time the growth-stabilization measures brought about a clear rebound in Q4 2012, but in reality Q1 2013 didn’t continue that rebound, the effects didn’t last as long as last time.

Another aspect can be seen from the attitude expressed by the central government. The government’s tolerance for a GDP slow-down is strengthening, and there’s a lot of will to move forward with changes. Recently the central government has squeezed the bubble in the financial system. This will sacrifice the speed of present GDP growth, a highly necessary step to boost long term healthy growth.

SLW: You’ve mentioned that there will be changes to Chinese economic growth: 2015-2020 growth will be 6-8%, 2020-2030 growth will be 4-6%, 2030 onwards growth will be 2-4%. That says that we’re in a transitional period from high growth to medium and low growth. What do you think are some signs of the new stage the Chinese economy has entered?

LZJ: One is that the Chinese economy has just changed from a high-growth stage to a medium-growth stage. These last two years it’s been stepping down, and the 10+ percent growth rates of the past 30 years are already gone and not coming back.

Two is that China has started to enter a period of economic adjustment. It’s working through a couple years of economic structural and strategic adjustment, digesting the bubbles and contradictions that exist in the economy. This kind of adjustment needs to occur during a period of reasonable growth rates.

Third, China has entered a delicate period in terms of the “middle-income trap”. According to international experience, you enter this period when average incomes exceed $4,000. Up until now China has just stepped into this delicate period. In reality, China has already seen the appearance of problems that occurred in other countries caught in the middle-income trap, for example increases in the income gap, the intensification of social conflicts, difficulties in transforming and upgrading production processes.

Fourth, China has just entered a period of high costs. The cost of land, raw materials, energy resources, labor, capital, and intellectual property are all going up. It means China’s competitive advantage from low costs isn’t that obvious anymore.

Fifth, China’s industrialization has entered the middle and late stages, and “the second half stages of heavy industrialization.” The characteristic of this stage is that you need the blending of development in heavy industry and productive service industries. The first half of heavy industry’s development was a period of expanding capacity, the second half is about elevating quality, and economic growth will accordingly decrease. After these phases end, you enter a “post-industrial society”, and this is the reason that after 2020 we’ll see economic growth rates continue to decline.

Sixth, China’s urbanization has entered the second phase of its acceleration. According to international experience, urbanization is in its accelerating phase when urbanization rates are between 30 and 70%. In 2012 China’s urbanization rate was 52.6%, meaning it’s just transition from the first half to the second half of this acceleration. It’s the same as industrialization: the first half of this phase is about expanding quantity, but when you enter the second half, even though speeds are pretty fast, you’re already transitioning to the phase of elevating quality. When you enter this phase, the scope of basic infrastructure and real estate development will correspondingly shrink, causing economic growth to slow down.

SLW: Other than reasons originating in the Chinese economy, are there external factors influencing this?

LZJ: External factors are playing a role, for example, the decline in demand from abroad. After the international economic crisis passed a portion of external demand returned to China, but there’s also a portion that’s been lost forever. As America and other countries are reflecting on the international financial crisis, they’re reflecting on the past economic development model of “high consumption, advance consumption, debt-driven consumption”. The result is that they won’t again have such high consumption, advance consumption and debt-driven consumption. This means that even though the international financial crisis is over, there’s a portion of demand for Chinese exports that’s gone forever.

This means that the potential growth rates for China have declined. This is the best growth rate that various environmental resources and factors of production can support. In the past the constraints from the resource environment weren’t that great, and you added on the large dividend from institutional changes that released productive capacity, so one could maintain high growth rates for such a long period of time. But now resource constraints are constantly growing, and the space for boosts from transformations that release productive capacity is also relatively shrinking. Because of this China’s potential growth rates have dropped.

“Squeezing the bubble” and “soft landings”

SLW:  In the last few years as academics started to call out that China’s competitive advantage in the world would decline steeply, they referred to a decrease in the “demographic dividend.” Are changes in the demographic dividend, an important factor causing China’s growth rates to decline?

LZJ: Demographic dividends are just one factor influencing China’s growth rates. The objective forces behind Chinese growth rates involve a wide range of things. They include the drivers of demand, what people often call the “three-horse carriage” [investment, consumption, exports]. Second you have the drive from structural optimization, including industrialization, urbanization, regional economic integration, industrial upgrading, etc. Third, the increase in factor inputs. Fourth, the upgrade in factor inputs, such as technological progress, growth in human capital, information technology, etc. Fifth, is institutional change. Institutional changes can  mobilize each person’s pro-activeness and creativity, and these can boost economic growth. Sixth, distortions, especially those that suppress prices for the factors of production. Seventh, suppressing expenditures on welfare can increase expenditures on economic development. Eighth, the use of economic stimulus. Ninth, the corporatization of government and the pursuit of excessive growth rates.

Looking at it today, six of these have already experienced problems on some level. All you have left is institutional change, structural optimization and factor upgrades. In the future these three forces will be the main drivers, and the most important will be institutional change, because structural optimization and factor upgrades both rely on institutional change.

SLW: So that’s to say the economic stimulus methods we used in the past, the things that kept our low-price competitive advantage are disappearing, and the expenditures on welfare that have been squeezed out in the future need to be made up. Left over we just have institutional change, structural optimization and factor upgrades, these three aspects can push forward economic growth. So in the future when we do macro-economic analysis, should we be paying more attention to changes in these three factors?

LZJ: I think our angle for doing macro-economic analysis should be more diverse. In the past we relied too much on Keynes’ macro-economic framework. In reality, there is exist some major defects in it. Keynes’ macro-economic analytical framework over-emphasized exports, investment and consumptions, these three forces acting on demand. In contrast, it overlooked the role of supply, and in reality economic development is the result of the overlap between supply and demand. The elements of supply include technological development, increases in human capital, structural upgrades and institutional innovation, etc etc.

In the past we over-emphasized short-term analysis and overlooked medium and long-term analysis. We overemphasized economic factor analysis and overlooked non-economic factor analysis. In the past we overemphasized the government’s role and overlooked the market’s role. As we combated the crisis for the past few years, the government clearly applied Keynesian theory: the crisis began, economic growth slipped, unemployment rose, and we just started emphasizing the role of government. The government initiated large-scale investment, construction and money printing. This brought about two results: On the one hand, the economy had a quick rebound and recovery, the results were almost immediate. On the other hand, the economy began to display or prepared to display large-scale asset price bubbles, inflation, non-performing loans, debt, over-capacity, and a retreat of marketization.

Also, in the past we over-emphasized total macro-economic analysis, and overlooked the micro-analysis of individual behavior. In reality economic development is always about the integration of macro and micro, the macro results are built on a foundation made of micro behaviors.

SLW: During the era of high economic growth, we were always scared by the thought of an economic downturn. In reality what kind of challenges will an economic downturn bring about? Are we going to be able to deal with it calmly?

LZJ: The challenges faced during an economic downturn are all encompassing. They include long-term inflation, accumulated economic bubbles, increasing resource and environmental constraints, an increase in the social expenditures of economic development, and the deterioration of the international environment, to name a few. The problems and the challenges aren’t frightening, but what’s frightening is that we don’t know where they are. Once we see clearly what the problems and challenges are, we can absolutely handle these challenges.

SLW: These days a lot of people are wondering, will the bubbles accumulated in the economy pop?

LZJ: If the government applies macro-controls in an extremely skillful way, slowly squeezing the bubble, while also not letting them cause an economic crisis or social unrest, while also cultivating in a timely way new sources of economic growth and competitive advantage, pushing forward industry structural changes and upgrades, then this is what you’d call a “soft landing,” the bubbles won’t pop. During the so called “money panic” of late June, in the process of resolving it the central government expressed the determination to squeeze the bubble. The central government hopes to use reforms to make the real estate market turn into a regular industry, and also give a fairer competitive environment in the real economy. This affects reforms to monopoly privileges for example, and a whole set of questions about institutional reform.

SLW: Some people see the decrease in economic growth and inflation, and they think this is a necessary expression of a “soft landing”.

LZJ: The problem might not be that simple, a drop in growth rates and inflation doesn’t necessarily mean a complete soft landing. A soft landing has to be a safe landing, and a safe landing means that as growth rates slide, economic structures are smoothly adjusted, new sources of growth slowly appear. If it doesn’t happen like this, it will cause business losses and bankruptcies to increase, debt burdens to grow, financial dangers to grow. This is what they call a “hard landing.” In addition, as the new sources of growth appear, they have to rely on institutional change, factor upgrades and structural optimization, the “three big motors” (not the “three horse-carriage of short-term exports, investment and consumption). This requires a process.

SLW: In the past the government said that in maintaining economic growth, a very important indicator was that GDP growth had to stay above 8%. Only then could China resolve employment issues. Right now economic growth has already slipped, have the challenges in terms of employment grown bigger?

LZJ: The slide in growth rates means that demand will shrink, orders will shrink, and markets will contract. Lots of businesses might end up taking losses and going bankrupt. Employment opportunities will shrink, work will be hard to find. Right now our economy will have a hard time pursuing high-speed growth. From here on out the difficulties in employment will grow. Western countries are already so developed, and there it’s still hard to resolve employment problems, the unemployment rates are still high. So from now on as China’s economy slows down, employment pressures will in fact grow.

SLW: But now these kinds of pressures will need to rely on the market to make adjustments. It’s not that the government can simply apply controls and resolve things.

LZJ: After changing the mode of economic development, from now on we’ll have to rely on social investment to drive economic growth, not like in the past when we relied on government investment. Bu social investment means using one’s own money, so investors will be very cautious, they’ll want to evaluate whether the returns will be great, whether the risk is high. If investors feel that the risk is too high, that the returns aren’t great enough, they just won’t invest, they’d rather choose to wait and see or to engage in speculation.

We originally relied on normal factors (like resources, labor, etc.), but from now on we’ll have to rely on high-level factors (like technology, human capital, etc.), in order to drive the economy. With normal factors China has a few advantages, but we have a scarcity of high-level factors. If we want to make the change to relying on high-level factors for economic development, the first question we have to deal with is how to engage in positive competition with developed countries. If China wants to make use of high-level factors, it has to resolve problems related to incentive mechanisms, especially intellectual property, but also many more.

The challenges for local government reform

SLW: We’ve been talking about reform for so many years, the main question for each phase of reform is different. Now growth rates are going down, it’s said that reform has entered the deep water phase, what changes have there been to the target of reform?

LZJ: The target of the new phase of reforms isn’t the planned economic system, instead it’s the transitional distorted system. It’s shown certain characteristics, for example: “privileged and elite market economy systems” (power mixed in with buying and selling), “monopoly market economy systems” (powerful monopolized industries), “preferential market economic systems” (preferential policies have a far-reaching impact on fairness in markets), “urban-rural split market economic systems” (urban-rural residence permits, land, welfare systems aren’t united), “spreading market economy systems” (education, healthcare, religion, and other public goods are overly marketized), “pricing benefits in market economic systems” (electricity, water, oil, natural gas, and other important energy sources have had prices suppressed, they’ve become a form of disguised welfare).

SLW: With so many problems requiring reform, what area should be the starting point for reforms?

LZJ: In terms of finance, we need to reduce non-performing assets, deleverage, and find new areas for investment. In terms of local governments, efforts need to be focused on reducing the debt burden, get rid of the reliance of land-fueled finances, and find new sources of growth. In terms of businesses, we need to reduce the burden, reduce overcapacity, and find new sources of profit.

SLW: Talking about local governments, everyone has been criticizing “land-fueled finances” for quite a few years, but it’s always proved hard to change. In the end, is it because we can’t resolve the problem of mismatch between responsibilities and finances?

Local governments do in fact face a lot of problems. There debt burden is heavy, and the revenue-expenditures gap brings a lot of pressure. From last year’s Two-Meetings up through the central government work conference, Politburo meetings have all emphasized the dangers of local government debt. This means the central government is putting a lot of focus on this problem. International organizations have also reduced China’s ratings because of the dangers of local government debt. If the dangers from local debt keep growing, the next step is the chance of danger to the whole government finance system or to localities.

“Land-fueled finances” is an old problem. With such little money, local governments can’t do all the much. When GDP is the main assessment metric, selling land is the most realistic method. But our land system is far from perfect, rural land isn’t really completely collective. A lot of legal loopholes exist, and governments can set high prices when reselling land.

SLW: Nowadays land-sale polices have become difficult to sustain.

LZJ: It is difficult to sustain. High housing prices have caused a lot of problems in today’s society. On the one hand there’s a great danger in terms of local government debt. Wealth has become overly-concentrated in government, and that’s created problems of unsound distribution. If you want to resolve the problem at a deeper level, you’ve first got to have reforms to the land system itself, let rural collectives truly own the land, make it the same as the system in the cities with identical rights, local governments can’t use land to generate wealth. Also, the finance and tax system needs reform. Make central vs. local government financial powers match their responsibilities. Right now there’s low-efficiency in some financial transfers and that creates waste. Furthermore, the central government’s system for assessments needs to be changed. Lots of governments have become corporatized. Governments should primarily rely on taxes from businesses and the people for their sources of income, it shouldn’t be that governments go out and directly earn money. If from now on our assessment system can become a 360-degree assessment, lower-tier governments assessing upper-tiers, the people assessing the government, this kind of government would set goals and work hard on improving employment and people’s livelihood.

SLW: The central and local governments are in the midst of this transition, it’s a bit like a game of chess.

LZJ: Right now lots of local governments see pressures on expenditures continually growing, administrative expenditures, infrastructure expenditures, affordable housing construction expenditures, social welfare expenditures, stability maintenance expenditures and others are all growing. But government revenues are actually shrinking. Because small and medium enterprises aren’t doing well industrial and commercial taxes have gone down, and because housing prices went down they brought down revenue from land sales. The “medium-growth phase” has arrived and relieved local governments of a portion of the pressure from the great GDP-growth competition. It’s made the more engaged in social management, and this will also create a good environment for transforming the economic development model.

The national government has the nation to consider, local governments have local concerns.  Some places originally were major coal or steel provinces. If you want to adjust the structures, the bulk of economic growth is gone. So local governments start from their own GDP, government revenue and social stability maintenance, meaning the push-back against structural adjustment will be great. Whether or not you’re the central or local government, you want to set out considering the big picture, the long-term.

SLW: Right now we’re about to commence large-scale urbanization, will this be a new opportunity for local governments? Will they use this to slowly shed the dangers of their debts, look for new sources of growth?

LZJ: Recent urbanization has been given a new historical mission: expand domestic demand and cultivate new sources of growth. All over you have property developers and capital market investors moving at the first whiff, all clamoring to raise the banner of urbanization. This has got to arouse our vigilance. New urbanization at root is a good thing, but if we don’t pay attention to guidance, under the force of big investment, big demolition, big construction, and “build the city campaigns”, the development of housing and property might go astray and bring with it hard to predict consequences.

Our earlier urbanization showed some problems, for example urbanization of land replaced urbanization of people, stratification in cities replaced fairness in cities. In lots of countries cities aren’t given an administrative rank, they compete fairly. The difference is that China’s urban centers are separated by rank; there are directly-administered cities, sub-municipal cities, prefectural-level cities, sub-prefectural level cities, county-level cities, towns, villages, lots of different administrative ranks. High-ranking cities can use non-market trading methods to extract funds, resources and talent from low-ranking municipalities. This has meant that in the majority of Chinese cities their scale is proportional to their administrative rank, not their actual competitiveness. The factors of production aren’t distributed according to economic zones, but according to administrative zones or the certain configurations of power. This distorts the deployment of resources and reduces national and regional overall competitiveness. If you don’t destroy the urban administrative ranking system and let small municipalities become cities, it might become just another method for creating government posts.

SLW: So that’s to say that the new urbanization will require a portion of subsidies from local governments?

LZJ: The new urbanization is people-centered urbanization, and it will actually bring a lot of challenges to local governments. New urbanization is a natural historical process; you can’t independently move ahead, and you need to deal with the connection between marketization, industrialization and agricultural modernization.

Because the government has to figure out how to turn rural residents into city residents, the current cake enjoyed by urban residents has to also be distributed to peasants, housing prices also can’t be so high. The core of local governments is developing competitive industries. Urbanization should be a natural result of industrialization. If there aren’t industries, how are you going to have jobs for people entering the cities? Right now the hukou system has become the tiger standing between rural residents and welfare benefits, so we fundamentally want to slowly unify the urban and rural social welfare system.
SLW: You mention that the core of urbanization is developing competitive industries, but nowadays industry development has run into ever-increasing environmental protection demands. Will this add to the difficulties of developing these industries?

LZJ: Low-carbon development is a trend in today’s world, and in regards to this you don’t want to believe all the clamor of the conspiracy theorists. If we cling to what the conspiracy theorists say, when most of the countries in the world have already entered or applied new low-carbon rules and procedures, in the end we’ll be the ones to lose out. The essence of low-carbon development is to solve the problem of sustainability on Earth. This is a universal value, but in advancing low-carbon development China will face some unique challenges.

In developed countries, industrialization and urbanization are basically complete, they’ve already entered a low-carbon phase. At this point emphasizing CO2 emissions is like taking a knife to the throat, while to developed countries it’s just taking a knife to the tail. Also, China’s resource endowment creates a high-carbon structure. China has plenty of coal but little oil and gas, and the proportion of new energy sources is also low, right now just around 9.8%. Coal mining and consumption is a major source of carbon emissions, and China’s coal-abundant structure doesn’t help advance low-carbon development.

In addition, in the international distribution of labor, China is a part of the low-end manufacturing segment, that doesn’t help low-carbon development. In the international division of labor, manufacturing and assembly create the most emissions. In reality this means that developed countries have moved a lot of the carbon emitting phases to China, creating the problem of international transfers of carbon emissions.

SLW: But overall you’ve expressed optimism about the Chinese economy, you think that over the next 20 years China can maintain around 4-8% growth rates. Is that to say that China won’t fall into the middle-income trap?

LZJ: In industrial development phase, we’re still in our robust youth. We’re still going to see a major liberation of China’s productive forces. What we call productive forces is the capacity that industrialization, urbanization, and regional economic integration will unleash. China’s industrialization, urbanization, regional economic integration is still in a middle-phase, and western countries have already basically finished this. This is our country’s advantage.

The productive forces of institutional change will also be liberated. In the past our focal point was pushing forward reforms of the economic system. In the future we also want to push forward political, cultural, economic, social, environmental/resource, these five-in-one reforms. In addition, the productive forces of factor upgrades will also see a big liberation. Technological progress, human capital, and information networks all have lots of space for development.

 

Pink shirt on coat hanger

IMG_20130717_173743

Nothing too much to say. I took this picture outside my dorm yesterday because I liked the way the scene looked. The pink shirt is the uniform of the cleaning staff in the building, and I think the building to the right is where some of them live.

Click picture to enlarge.

A 陕西 scene

IMG_20130619_194536

(Photo taken at 西安师范大学, click on pictures to enlarge)

I got this picture on my last trip to Xi’an, and to me it just puts so much of that city and Shaanxi province together. The 13 cranes, the abundance of 哥们儿s just chillin, the old building in the background that’s just about leaning over the pool… I spent my first year in China in Xi’an and I just love that place to death.

And a thanks to the local laowai who puts three years of solid Shaanxi time to work by routinely blowing up the pool spot with all the swag California has to offer:

IMG_20130619_182813

Translation: 王菲 – 开到荼蘼, Faye Wong – The Last Blossom

王菲

Today I’m doing a translation of the lyrics for what is probably my all-time favorite Chinese song:   开到荼蘼 by 王菲 (otherwise known as “The Last Blossom” by Faye Wong).

On music and lyrics it is just head and shoulders above the sticky and sappy mess that is most Chinese pop music. She’s out there just kicking ass and taking no prisoners, really doing women all over China a favor.

My translation is fairly literal throughout, but there’s a lot in there that defies simple translation. Her lyrics (which she didn’t write, in this case) are really poetic and ocassionally difficult for Chinese people themselves to understand. Below the lyrics I’ve pointed out a couple places where I’m not sure on the correct translation.

Here is the mp3 开到荼蘼

and here is a link to the music video (a little silly, but hey, it’s 1999):

http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMTYxNjgyNzU2.html

王菲 – 开到荼蘼

每只蚂蚁                                                          Every single ant
都有眼睛鼻子                                                   Has eyes and a nose
它美不美丽                                                      Beautfiul or not
偏差有没有一毫厘                                            It’s not a millimeters difference
有何关系                                                          What does it matter?
每一个人                                                          Every single person
伤心了就哭泣                                                   If you’re hurt let the tears run
饿了就要吃                                                       If you’re hungry then just eat
相差大不过天地                                                It can’t beat the gap between heaven and Earth
有何刺激                                                          What’s there to get excited about?

有太多太多魔力                                                It’s all far too much magic
太少道理                                                          And far too little reason
太多太多游戏                                                   Far too many games
只是为了好奇                                                   All just out of curiosity
还有什么值得                                                   What’s there still worth
歇斯底里                                                          Getting hysterical about
对什么东西                                                       What are you
死心塌地                                                           really dead set on?

一个一个偶像                                                   Every single last idol                                                 都不外如此                                                       they’re no exception                                                  沉迷过的偶像                                                   The idols that mesmerized you
一个个消失                                                       They disappear one by one
谁曾伤天害理                                                    Whoever can scar heaven and Earth
谁又是上帝                                                       They’re a new God
我们在等待                                                       And we’re still here waiting
什么奇迹                                                           Waiting on what miracle?

最后剩下自己                                                    In the end you’re left with yourself
舍不得挑剔                                                        You can’t afford to be picky
最后对着自己                                                     In the end you face yourself
也不大看得起                                                     You won’t be thinking too highly
谁给我全世界                                                     Whoever gives me the whole world
我都会怀疑                                                         I’ll doubt it all
心花怒放                                                            The heart’s flower in full bloom
却开到荼蘼                                                         It’s the last blossom

一个一个一个人                                                  One person after another
谁比谁美丽                                                          Who’s more beautiful?
一个一个一个人                                                   One person after another
谁比谁甜蜜                                                          Who’s sweeter?
一个一个一个人                                                   One person after another
谁比谁容易                                                          Who’s easier?
又有什么了不起                                                   What’s left that’s so great?

每只蚂蚁                                                              Every single ant                                                     跟谁擦身而过                                                       Whoever they rub up against                                都那么整齐                                                           It’s all so neat and tidy                                          有何关系                                                              What’s it matter?                                                    每一个人                                                              Every single person                                              碰见所爱的人                                                       They bump into the person they love                    却心有余悸                                                           And the heart is left with a lingering fear.

 

Parts that I think need particular help include the translation of “心花怒放,开到荼蘼“ and 最后对着自己, 也不大看得起 (not sure if I got the implication of “也不大看得起” right). Also would love to hear feedback on anything else.

What’s possible without pollution

This last week had one of the biggest swings in pollution that I’ve ever seen. We went from around 500 (aka “Crazy Bad”) to 50 (gorgeous) in the span of a couple days, and it brought my mood along with it.

I don’t think it’s far out to imagine a change in pollution levels bringing about (or coinciding with) a comparable change in national mood. (click on any picture to enlarge)

 

IMG_20130628_165931  IMG_20130702_175213

Here’s the view from a great little river I just discovered nearby, a helpful reminder that Beijing actually good be a beautiful city:

IMG_20130703_193006

And here is the view from the top of the hill in 景山公园 (and the people there to catch the view):

IMG_20130702_195406   IMG_20130702_193449

My (phone) camera isn’t nearly good enough to do it justice but it was a stunning sunset, and I imagine it really lifted the spirits of people wise enough to go out and see it.

 

Consternation Basian

Lately I’ve been taking pictures of the cutest Chinese basians (baby+asian = basian) that I see around. This little lady was hanging out on a quiet street near Chaoyang Park with her grandma. She was curious/happy at first, but when I had her turn toward the sunlight she furrowed her brow and became “consternation basian”:

IMG_20130513_154101

Here’s her more kindly/inquisitive expression:

IMG_20130513_154054